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This paper examines the efficacy of the arbitral law and ADR of Kenya. It postulates that while various 
reasons may be advanced to justify the poor utilization of the arbitral and ADR processes, the fact that from 
its inception in 1914, the legal framework disregarded local dispute resolution mechanisms is discernible as 
the main exposition. Second, domestication of international conventions has not engendered arbitration since 
it was adopted without the necessary policy framework, modifications or adaptation of the law to local 
circumstances. The Arbitration Act 1968 illuminates this postulation succinctly. The existing legal framework 
is oblivious to ADR mechanisms, is replete with omissions and encapsulates no decipherable policy. In a 
nutshell, the legal regime can neither enhance nor endear arbitration or ADR. There is a compelling case for 
comprehensive reforms and revision of the Arbitration Act, 1995.      
 




Kenya has had laws on Arbitration from as early as 1914,
1
 is a signatory to both the New York
2
 and the 
Washington Conventions
3
 and adopted UNCITRALs Model Law in 1995. Nevertheless, arbitration has yet to 
win the confidence of traders and others as one of the basic dispute resolution mechanisms in the country. The 
level of utilization of this important method of resolving civil disputes is disconcerting and there is an 
overwhelming case for a paradigmatic shift of emphasis from litigation to arbitration. The most basic hallmark 
of arbitration is the liberty enjoyed by the parties in fashioning the proceedings. They have capacity to tailor 
the scope of the submission. They enjoy wide latitude in selecting the persons who will serve as arbitrators. 
This is a form of security that has no parallel in litigation. Essentially, arbitration is a private process with a 
significant degree of autonomy and self sufficiency. It is characterized by countless advantages; notably, 
neutrality, finality, binding nature of decisions, speed and confidentiality.
4
 Although the arbitral process has 
several shortcomings
5
 and is unsuitable in circumstances in which the dispute involves many parties, it is 
commonly a perfect substitute for litigation. It does not deny the parties the right to seek judicial redress if 
they so desire and  more  importantly, if a party is dissatisfied with the arbitral  award, it is entitled to 
challenge the award in the High court which has jurisdiction to set the award aside. 
 
Amazingly, parties to contracts and other economic undertakings prefer ordinary courts in dispute resolution.  
As a consequence, court diaries are perpetually clogged and cases take far too long to conclude. On average, 
civil cases take between four and eight years to conclude.  Land disputes may take as long as twenty years.
6
 
Most litigants are unaware of other cost effective and reliable alternatives. A writer with one of the most 
authoritative Business Newspapers in Kenya recently remarked that: “When arbitration is fully embraced as 
an alternative solution to resolving intriguing commercial disputes, a great deal of workload in the judiciary 
will be eased”
7
 The upshot of these words is that arbitration has yet to attain the level of acceptance and 
utilization necessary to make it an important dispute resolution mechanism in Kenya. Against this 
background, the centrality and importance of arbitration in dispute resolution cannot be gainsaid.  
                                                          
1
 Arbitration Ordinance, 1914 
2
 This is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958. 
3
This is the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 1965.  
4
 See ICC International Court of Arbitration, “International Dispute Resolution Services: Introduction to Arbitration” at 
http:/www.iccwbo.org/English/arbitration/introduction.asp, (last visited on Feb.18th 2009). 
5
 For example the process can be more expensive than ordinary courts and arbitral awards have no precedential value. 
6
 See George Njau Maichibu v. Mungai Maichibu & Joseph Kimani Waithima (2007)eKLR which was filed in 1981 but 
was not concluded until 2008 
7
 Benson Wambugu, Kenya: Arbitration Cuts Backlog in Courts, BUSINESS DAILY June 23, 2008 at 2. 
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But why has arbitration not been embraced even by the business community and those involved in commerce? 
The answer to this fundamental question lies partly in the manner in which arbitration was introduced and 
adopted before and after independence. For introductory purposes, this paper argues that one of the reasons 
why the impact of arbitration has yet to be felt is that it was presented as an exotic concept foreign to the 
experiences of the local population and business community. This hypothesis is exemplified below. Second, it 
is discernible that there has never been a clearly defined policy to promote arbitration and ADR. Third, neither 
courts of law nor the legislature have actively promoted arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.  
Fourth, the legal framework has not played the requisite facilitative or supportive role for arbitration. For 
purposes of clarity in this paper, arbitration is not treated as an integral part of ADR.  
 
Until recently, courts appear to have been guided by the traditional view that they had exclusive jurisdiction in 
dispute resolution. This notion is predicated on the conception that judicial power is the exclusive preserve of 
the state and arbitrators exercise powers delegated to them by the state. Being a private and consensual 
procedure, arbitration has been perceived as competition with the courts in the administration of justice
8
.  
Judicial control of the arbitral process has been imperious hanging like the proverbial Sword of Damocles. 
However, with time, courts have grudgingly accepted that they cannot cope with their ever increasing work 
load, and they are slowly embracing arbitration and ADR, even though it is not out conviction that it is a 
positive alternative. Sir John Donaldson‟s observation that arbitrators and judges are partners in the business 





 Courts of Law have not been instrumental in the popularization and promotion of arbitration as a dispute 
resolution mechanism. Although the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa appear to have recognized the role of 
arbitration in the 1960s,
10
 courts have not been proactive in encouraging and enabling litigants appreciate the 




Rather belatedly, the words of Justice Visram in Alfred Wekesa Sambu & Ors v. Mohammed Hatimy & Ors
12
 
encapsulate the role courts should have been playing in promoting the utilization of arbitration and ADR in 
dispute resolution. He observed: 
 
“Where members of an organization have chosen, by virtue of their very membership, to settle 
their disputes through arbitration, I see absolutely no reason why the courts should interfere in that 
process. It is not in the public interest…The courts should encourage as far as possible settlement of 
disputes outside of the court process. Arbitration is one of several methods of alternate dispute 
resolution and is certainly less expensive, expeditious, informal and less intimidating than the formal 
court system. This court will certainly encourage the use of alternate dispute resolution where it is 
appropriate to do so.” 
 
In this case, the National Executive Committee of the Kenya Football Federation (KFF) had passed a 
resolution removing the plaintiffs from various offices of the association. The plaintiffs applied for an 
injunction to restrain the defendants from implementing the resolution. They also sought a declaration that the 
purported removal was contrary to the Constitution and Rules of KFF. Astoundingly, although the constitution 
of the Kenya Football Federation provided for resolution of disputes by arbitration, neither party had 
contemplated the option. The High Court invoked section 6 of the Arbitration Act 1995 paving the way for the 
arbitral process. This section is dealt with in detail in Part Three of the paper. It confers upon the High court 
jurisdiction to refer a dispute to arbitration on application by the defendant if the agreement between the 
parties provide for the resolution of disputes by arbitration. Importantly, the defendants had not sought a stay 
of the proceedings. This decision is exceedingly sagacious since it places the arbitral process in its rightful 
place in dispute resolution.  
 
It is instructive to note that currently there is no statutory framework for a court mandated arbitration or ADR 
before litigation.
13
 We intend to demonstrate that over the years the legal structure in Kenya guaranteed that 
courts retained ultimate control over the arbitral process and did not accommodate ADR. 
                                                          
8
 See JULIAN D.M.LEW, THE APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 51-61 (1978). 
9
 See JOHNSON DONALDSON, ARBITRATION 98 (1982). 
10
 Duffus J A in Rashid Moledina v. Hoima Ginners (1967) E.A. 645 at 650 quoting Nauman v. Nathan (1930) 37 Lloyds 
Rep. 250 
11
 Order XLV 
12
 (2007) e KLR 
13
 See supra note 6. Records indicate that as of early  June 2008, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Sub-committee of 
the Rules Committee of the High Court  had started working with the local chapter of the Chartered Institute of 





Arbitration is an adjudicative process in which the parties present evidence and arguments to an impartial and 
independent third party who has the authority to hand down a binding decision based on objective standards. 
An arbitral award is final and binding. It is equivalent to judgment of a court of law and is recognized as 
such.
14
 It is an important method of deciding disputes other than litigation and is regulated by fairly well 
established principles of law. Although the law on arbitration has been part of the statutory framework for 
many years, it is only recently that the practice of arbitration has attracted serious attention and attempts are 
now being made to ensure that it takes its rightful place in the dispute resolution hierarchy. Adoption of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on international commercial arbitration in 1995 showed the way. Today Kenya has a 
local chapter of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators with a membership of about 200 arbitrators. Lamentably, 
most of the arbitrators are based in Nairobi. Although these developments have raised the profile of arbitration 
as a dispute resolution mechanism, the level of utilization of this mechanism remains dismal. In our view this 
state of affairs is traceable to the manner in which arbitration was introduced and the shortcomings of the 
successive legal frameworks. 
 
The transplantation of English law through the Orders-in-Council 1900 and 1907 saw the beginning of a new 
historical epoch in dispute resolution in colonial Kenya.
15
 It heralded the demise of customary practices of 
dispute resolution. But surprisingly, arbitration was re-introduced by the Arbitration Ordinance 1914 as an 
extrinsic concept. The Ordinance was based on the English Arbitration Act 1889 whose central feature was 
the absolute control of the arbitral process by courts of law.
16
 The English statute was amended in 1950 but 
retained the main provisions of its predecessor. After independence, Kenya‟s parliament promulgated a new 
Arbitration Act, Chapter 49 (now repealed). This Act was a carbon copy of the English Arbitration Act of 
1950 and remained the operative statute until 1995 when the current Arbitration Act was proclaimed. 
Noteworthy, none of the successive statutes ever made reference to customary arbitration or alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms.  
 
 It is thus imperative to examine the suitability of the legal framework on arbitration and make the necessary 
recommendations for reforms. As arbitration and other ADR become increasingly institutionalized, it is 
essential that the law encapsulates the necessary policy changes, and reflect societal and global dynamics. 
This is inevitable if the country is to take advantage of international investment and commerce. Undeniably, 
investors and traders attach a high premium on the availability of effective dispute resolution mechanisms as 
an alternative to the court system. Arbitration and ADR are the preferred options. These mechanisms 
encourage investment and engender growth.  Our recommendations in this paper could assist policy makers 
and legislators in formulating the future policy and legal framework on arbitration and ADR. 
 
Part One of the paper is a brief demonstration of how pre-colonial African communities resolved disputes by 
institutions and principles analogous to arbitration and mediation. This is intended to illustrate that dispute 
resolution practices similar to arbitration and mediation as understood in a modern context characterized many 
pre-colonial societies.  In the same vein, it will show the propinquity of the arbitral process to practices of the 
local population as opposed courts of law which represented a foreign concept yearning for demystification.  
Part Two is a description of the international aspects of the law on arbitration in Kenya. It seeks to elucidate 
the international background against which Kenyan law on arbitration is based. This part postulates that 
although Kenya has to some considerable extent kept pace with global developments in the law on arbitration 
and practice, and has even domesticated a significant part of the law, this has not engendered resort to the 
arbitral process as the mechanism remains largely unutilized. 
 
Part Three is an examination of the statutory framework on arbitration and its enforcement by courts of law. 
This part assumes a historical and analytical approach because it examines the provisions of the Arbitration 
Act, Chapter 49 (now repealed) and the Arbitration Act, 1995 which is the operative statute. The essence of 
this part is to  demonstrate how the law on arbitration has evolved. Decisions of the High Court and Court of 
Appeal are used to exemplify the judicial philosophy in dealing with disputes involving arbitration agreements 
.The analysis also highlights how the judicial philosophy has espoused or frustrated the arbitral process. The 
last part embodies our conclusion and recommendations for reform.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Arbitrators  to develop a framework for a court mandated arbitration or ADR before litigation. In addition, Order 45 Rule 3 provides 
that a court of law can order arbitral proceedings only if the parties file consent order to that effect.  
14
 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORMS AND PRECEDENTS Vol3 (1) para. 2. 
15
 This is the precursor to the Judicature Act, Cap 8 Laws of Kenya. 
16
 Section 21 of the Act gave the court power to direct an arbitrator or umpire to state any question of law arising in the course of 
the reference or an award or part thereof in the form of a special case for the decision of the court. 
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From the analysis in part three, it follows that there is a defensible argument for reforming the law on 
arbitration. It is our hypothesis that one of the most effective ways of institutionalizing the arbitral process in 
to recognize arbitration as a profession and provide for a professional body of arbitrators to inter alia 
spearhead the popularization and utilization of the arbitral process in dispute resolution. The import of this 
would be that experts in particular fields for instance transport, co-operative societies, horticulture and micro 
finance would be in a position to become arbitrators. Such a body should in addition be vested with power to 
prescribe rules of etiquette and punish errant arbitrators. The fact that the current statute does not prescribe the 
basic obligations of arbitral tribunals does not augur well with the arbitral process. It is critically important 
that the obligations be expressly defined. Moreover, their liability, if any, or immunity should be explicit. An 





Before the advent of colonialism and establishment of the modern state, pre-colonial societies in Africa had 
indigenous methods of resolving disputes. Many ethnic groups had evolved sophisticated dispute resolution 
mechanisms including mediation and arbitration though not described in such majestic terms. These 
mechanisms were characterized by overlap rather than clear boundaries. Mediation and arbitration were 
preferred because of their capacity to promote cohesion even after disruptive disputes. Restoration of the pre-





Kikuyu and Kamba Customs 
 
It is important to appreciate from the outset that African customary jurisprudence did not distinguish criminal 
and civil cases. For instance, under the customs of the Kamba community, whenever a person was accused of 
rape, the dispute between the families involved would be resolved by a Council of Elders which had mandate 
to determine how many cows or goats the offending family would give the aggrieved family. This resolved 
the dispute in totality. Among the Kikuyu, discounting minor disputes within a homestead which were 
resolved by the head of the house as a “judge,” all other disputes were resolved by a Council of Elders 
(referred to as “Kiama”).
18
 If a family dispute was serious, all the heads of families within the kinfolk 
(referred to as “Mbari”) would be invited by the head of the family involved to participate in the resolution.
19
 
The power to resolve all land disputes was vested in the Council of Elders, which also conducted all land 
transactions.
20
 In a typical dispute, disputants would take a customary oath to affirm the veracity of their 
testimony, present their evidence and call witnesses, if any, to testify on their behalf. The elders would then 
consult between themselves and decide the matter. Almost invariably, the Council of Elders would decide 
what the party whose rights had been violated would receive as compensation, which ordinarily took the form 
of cows or goats. The decision was typically announced by the senior-most elder. The disputants would then 
be asked if they agreed with the decision of the elders.
21
 If either of the parties disagreed with the decision, the 
matter would be postponed to another day for reconsideration and the decision of the Council of Elders at this 





Customs of the Kipsigis 
 
Among the Kipsigis which is a sub-ethnic group of the larger Kalenjin community, dispute resolution 
operated at two levels depending on the gravity of the dispute. The lower level was the kotigonet which 
literary means giving advice. This institution was used to resolve minor disputes, mostly in a household or 
between neighbors. In these instances, the neighbors acted as arbiters by exhorting and persuading the 
disputants to live amicably. Ordinarily, 4-5 adult males took part. The eldest man in the group acted as the 
chairperson to maintain order. Although the kotigonet had no structured procedure, it mollified parties and 
resolved many minor disputes. The more serious disputes and those that the kotigonet could not resolve were 
resolved by the kokwet or kiruogik which literally means judgment. At least fifteen persons participated in 
decision making. Unlike the kotigonet, the kokwet had a formal procedure and was presided over by a 
volunteer who had to be a senior male.  
                                                          
17
 See generally Andrew Chukwuemerie, The Internationalization of African Customary Law of Arbitration, 
14 AFRI.  J.  INTL. COM. L.,   143-175 (2006). 
18
 JOMO KENYATTA. FACING MOUNT KENYA 205 (1938). 
19
 Id. at 206. 
20
 Id. at 26. 
21
 Id. at 208. 
22
 Id. 
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The person presiding was obligated to maintain order and facilitate resolution of the dispute. Proceedings took 
place at the place where the dispute occurred, such as land or the particular homestead. The disputants would 
give evidence and call witnesses to provide further testimony. They would then be excused for the kokwet to 
deliberate on the matter. Those present were now free to give their views on the dispute. The eldest person 
spoke first to set the tone and others followed. More often than not, the views of the eldest person, who had 
the privileged of speaking first, carried the day. Decisions were unanimous.
23
 Once the decision was made, the 
disputants would be recalled and the chairperson would formally announce it to them. If they were agreeable, 
the matter was deemed resolved. In the event of any dissent, another meeting would be scheduled to 
reconsider the matter. The dispute resolution mechanisms of the Kipsigis were eminently intended to ensure 
that settlement was as non-disruptive as possible.  It is evident that dispute resolution was contingent on 
negotiation rather than adjudication.  
 
The approach to dispute resolution employed by the three ethnic groups relied upon establish beyond 
controversy that customary arbitration and mediation were principal dispute resolution mechanisms.  The 
arbitral approach to dispute resolution was well entrenched in the social fabric of many African communities 
during the pre-colonial era. With the advent of colonization, these institutions were progressively dismantled 
by, inter alia, being denied legal recognition and ultimately ceased to function.  It is arguable that had these 
practices been recognized, legitimized and thus elevated as national approaches to dispute resolution, with 
necessary modifications, this would have placed arbitration on a different platform in the dispute resolution 
matrix.
24
 For many years arbitration has been viewed suspiciously and only a few had the temerity to go for it 
even where it was expressly provided for in the contract. Emphasis has exclusively been on litigation. It is 





The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that arbitration and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are 
neither exotic nor imported as portrayed. It is palpable that their non-recognition and legitimization by the 
operative legal framework partly explains their limited utilization in dispute resolution. Faced with such an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs, it becomes imperative to illuminate the origins and justifications of the legal 
frame work. We now propose to focus on the international background against which Kenya‟s arbitral law is 
based. This will enable us contextualize the operative statutory framework.  
 
International Aspects of Arbitral Laws 
 
Kenya is a Contracting Party to the New York and Washington Conventions and has domesticated the 
UNCITRAL Model Law which addresses different aspects of arbitration in disputes resolution.  Indisputably, 
International Conventions play an important role in the transnational legal environment. With regard to 
arbitration, they engender predictability by establishing common approaches to the enforcement of arbitral 
agreements and awards.
26
 Although the Washington Convention was designed to facilitate foreign investment, 
its contribution in popularizing and furtherance of international commercial arbitration has been phenomenal. 
However, the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law are regarded as the mainstays of 
international commercial arbitration.Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”) 
 
The ICSID Convention became operational on October 14th 1966 with about 28 members states; today 144 
countries have ratified the convention to become contracting parties. Kenya signed the Convention on May 
24th 1966, deposited the instrument of ratification on January 3rd 1967, and the Convention came into force 
on February 2nd 1967. The convention, which was promulgated under the auspices of the World Bank, 
establishes a specialized and relatively comprehensive arbitral regime. It provides the basic procedural 
framework for arbitration of investment disputes arising between member countries and investors who qualify 
as nationals of other countries. In addition, a plethora of regulations support the convention.
27
 The Convention 
establishes the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) whose principal mandate is 




                                                          
23
 See generally MICHEAL SUTTON, THE KIPSIGIS: A CASE STUDY IN CHANGING CUSTOMARY LAW, (1977). 
24
 See Senyo Adjabeng, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Ghana mhtml: file://H:Alternative Dispute Resolution in Ghana.mht. See 
also, Adedoyin Rhodes-Vivour: Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution as an instrument for Economic Reform, 
http:www.ciarbnigeria.org/Exco_Adedoyin Rhodes_Vivour, last visited on March 12th 2009  
25
 See HENRY J.B. & ARTHUR L. M.  ADR PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 80 (2005). 
26
 JACK J.C. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT (2007). 
27
 See http://icsid.wordbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR.(last visited of  March 5th 2009) 
28
 Article  1 
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The Center does not conciliate or arbitrate disputes but provides the institutional and procedural framework 
for independent arbitrators constituted in each case to resolve the dispute.
29
 Thus, the purpose of the center is 
to provide facilities for arbitration of investment disputes. The Convention confers upon the Center 
jurisdiction over disputes arising directly out of an investment. Although the arbitral procedures conducted 
under the aegis of ICSID are not mandatory, because of the profile of the Center, which though autonomous is 
an integral part of the World Bank system, contracting parties and their nationals have frequently utilized its 
services in investment disputes
30
. Arbitral proceedings are instituted by a written request to the Secretary 
General.
31
 The Convention contains detailed rules on the constitution,
32





replacement and disqualification of arbitrators,
35





One of the most striking features of the ICSID arbitral process is the inviolable character of the award. It is 
insusceptible to the jurisdiction of domestic courts of the contracting parties. Contracting parties are required 
to recognize and enforce the arbitral award.
37
 This is an unmatched attribute of the ICSID arbitral process. 
Apart from facilitating arbitration and conciliation, ICSID has since 1978 enforced the Additional Facility 
Rules, which authorize the ICSID Secretariat to administer certain categories of proceedings between states 
and nationals that are ultra vires the Convention.
38
 It is evident that Contracting Parties and their nationals 
have over the years made use of the ICSID facilities in the resolution of investment disputes. A review of the 
disputes filed, awards made, and pending cases create the picture of a system that has won the confidence of 




But, like the municipal arbitral processes, investors in Kenya have not utilized the ICSID facilities. Since 1967 
when Kenya became party to the Convention, only one dispute has been registered and determined under the 
auspices of ICSID. In the World Duty Free Co Ltd. V Republic of Kenya,
40
 the claimant, a company 
incorporated in United Arab Emirates had won a concession to operate duty free shops at the Jomo Kenyatta 
and Moi International Airports in Nairobi and Mombasa respectively, but the Government of Kenya 
terminated the contract unprocedurally.  The claimant referred the dispute to ICISD and an award was made in 
its favor.  Although it is prohibitively expensive
41
 to arbitrate under the aegis of ICSID, this cannot be the sole 
reason for the non-utilization of these facilities. Many foreign investors continue to rely on Kenyan courts in 
dispute resolution.
42
 Undoubtedly, the ICSID arbitral process has helped in the popularization and utilization 
of arbitration particularly on the international plane. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) The growth in international commercial arbitration and 
the need to harmonize arbitral laws led to the adoption of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
43
 The “New York Convention,” as it is ordinarily referred to, was adopted by a 
diplomatic Conference on June 10th 1958, prior to the establishment of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). It came into force on June 7th 1959.The Convention is recognized as 
one of the foundational instruments of international arbitration. It obligates courts of Contracting Parties to 





                                                          
29
 See ICSID Web page, http://ICSID.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp. (Last visited on Jan.29th 2009). 
30
 In 2008 for instance, a total of 145 disputes were filed. This was the highest number of cases since the establishment of the center. 
See ICSID Annual Report 2008 at 3. 
31
 Article 36 
32
 Article 37-40 
33
 Article 41-46 
34
 Article  48-49 
35
 Article 56-38 
36
 Article 53-54 
37
 Article 54 
38
  In 2008 for example, two cases were registered under the Additional Facility Rules. See supra note 14  
39
 See, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/frontservlet, (Last visited on March 16th 2009). The 2008 Annual Report of ICSID shows that 
more than 268 disputes have been registered with the Center. 
40
 ICSID Case No: ARB/00/7 registered on July 17th 2000. The award was rendered on October 4th 2006. 
41
 Excluding panel charges which amount toUSD.3, 000 per day unless otherwise agreed, the requesting party must pay a minimum 
of $ 55, 000.  
42
 A review of reported cases for the last 15 years show that most of the foreign owned companies, e.g. Kenya Breweries ltd, Barclays 
Bank ltd Kenya Shell ltd and Standard Chartered  Bank ltd appear to prefer courts of law in dispute resolution.  
43
 See HENRY & ARTHUR supra note 12 at 69 
44
RONALD B. HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION PRACTICE 348 (1987). See also http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/intrument-
text/Arbitration/NY Convention.html. See also Article 11 
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In addition, it requires courts to recognize and enforce foreign awards without reviewing the merits of the 
arbitral decision, subject to a few exceptions; e.g. the arbitrator exceeded jurisdiction or failed to accord the 
complaining party an opportunity to present its case.
45
 A ratifying nation may elect to limit the application of 
the New York Convention in two ways; (i) First, it may insist on reciprocity i.e. declare that it will accord 
convention treatment only to awards made in the territory of another contracting party (ii) Second, it may 
declare that it will apply the convention only to disputes arising from relationships characterized as 
“commercial” under its national law.
46
  UNCITRAL, whose mandate is harmonization and unification of 




Kenya ratified the New York Convention on February 10th 1989 and it became operational on 11th May 
1989. The country‟s membership to UNCITRAL expires in 2010. Inexplicably, Kenya adopted its first 
Arbitration Act in 1968 in total disregard of the New York Convention. Rather than incorporate the Articles of 
the Convention directly or even indirectly, the Arbitration Act, Chapter 49, Laws of Kenya, adopted the 
General Protocol on Arbitration Clauses 1923 and the Convention on the Execution of Foreign Awards 
1927
48
as its First and Second Schedules respectively. Both the Protocol and the Convention were repealed by 
the New York Convention.
49
 The General Protocol on Arbitration Clauses required Contracting Parties to 
recognize agreements to refer existing or future disputes in commercial matters to arbitration.
50
 Disputes not 
contemplated by the phrase “commercial matters” were not arbitrable. The Protocol did not specify the 
character of the agreement. Although the Convention on the Execution and Enforcement of Foreign Awards 
required Contracting Parties to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards, the relevant Article was not 




Admittedly, the New York Convention internationalized commercial arbitration by inter alia requiring courts 
in member states not only to recognize but also to enforce arbitral awards.
52
 Contracting Parties are 
constrained to recognize written arbitration agreements to refer disputes from contractual and other defined 
legal relationships to arbitration. However, the subject matter of the dispute must be capable of resolution by 
arbitration.
53
 This is a limitation on arbitrability of disputes. The Convention recognizes the substratum of 
arbitration which is autonomy of the parties. If an action founded on an arbitration agreement is instituted in a 
court of law, the court is enjoined to refer it to arbitration should one of the parties so request unless the 
agreement is inoperative, void or incapable of being performed.
54
This Article reduces the discretion of courts 
to decline a stay of proceedings.  Arguably, one of the most serious drawbacks of the New York Convention is 
Article V which enumerates various grounds on which recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may 
be refused. Some of the circumstances are too enveloping, such as “… the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country.” Although the Convention provides that an arbitral award is amenable to being 
set aside, judicial authority in different jurisdictions show that an award can only be set aside by “the 




 Closely allied to this argument is the fact that the Convention confers sweeping powers on domestic 
“competent authorities” to refuse to recognize and enforce foreign awards.
56
 This Article appears to give 
competent domestic authorities power to question the substantive law of other jurisdictions and this could 
stifle international commercial arbitration. The phrase “public policy” is too indeterminate, imprecise and 
susceptible to multiple interpretations. Arguably, it is possible for courts to frustrate enforcement of awards.  
However, it is irrefutable that the New York Convention is one of the most important multilateral Conventions 




                                                          
45
 Article V 
46
 Supra note 24 at 61 
47
 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/arbitration.html, (last visited on Jan.24th  2009). 
48
  These were documents concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations. 
49
 Article VII (2) 
50
 Para. 1 
51
 Article I & II 
52
 Article III 
53




 See  International standard Electric Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera 745F. Supp.172 (1990) US District Court of the 
Southern District of New York, Croatian Company.v. Swiss Company, 2 CROATIA ARB’N YEARBOOK 205(1995)Croatian High Commercial 
Court (1986), Oil 7& Natural Gas Commission v. Western Co. of North America 1986 74 A.I.R. S.C. 674  (1987) 
56
 Supra note 34. This Article catalogues the circumstances in which a domestic court can refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign 
award.  
57
 The Arbitration Act, Act No.4 of 1995 embodies Articles 1-V of the Convention. 
© Centre for Promoting Ideas, USA                                                                                         www.ijhssnet.com  
226 
 
This assertion is reinforced by the fact that the UNCITRAL Model Law on arbitration embraces the concept 
of the Convention and indeed adopts language. It is important to emphasize that in addition to the 
international conventions, Kenya has entered into bilateral investment agreements which provide for the 
resolution of disputes by arbitration. The most conspicuous is the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC) an insurance company is owned by the United States Government. Kenya has signed an executive 
agreement under the auspices of OPIC which authorizes the company to insure approved investments by 
United States nationals in the Kenya. For our purpose, the most important precept of the agreement is that it 
provides for the resolution of any disputes arising between the parties by arbitration under the sponsorship of 
the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). This is adequate testimony that 
the Government of Kenya appreciates the centrality of arbitration in the resolution of investment disputes. 
 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
 
The “UNCITRAL Model law” as it generally known, was the culmination of a comprehensive study by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on ways of harmonizing of laws on international 
commercial arbitration. It was adopted by the Commission on June 21st 1985.The endorsement was an 
acknowledgment that domestic arbitral laws were inappropriate in many respects and were characterized by 
disparities. Most domestic arbitral laws lacked pertinent provisions and were couched in permissive terms, 
something that did not augur well for international commercial arbitration. It was thus imperative to improve 
on the New York Convention to consolidate the gains of harmonization. The Model law is a framework 
Convention intended to guide countries in adopting domestic arbitral laws. The law is emphatic that an 
arbitration agreement must be written.
58
 For the first time, the law provided a definition of international 
arbitration.  The law encapsulates the policy of autonomy of the parties and restricts the involvement of courts 
of law in the arbitral process. This however should not be construed as indicative that the courts have no role. 
On the contrary they have a substantial role to play, such as, appointment of arbitral tribunals,
59
 challenging 
the appointment of  an arbitrator,
60
 termination of mandate of the arbitrator
61
, challenging the jurisdiction of 
the arbitral tribunal,
62
 and setting aside of the arbitral award.
63
 The Model Law is explicit that courts of law 
cannot intervene in the arbitral process except in the circumstances provided by the law.
64
 The law envisages a 
situation in which courts of law play a supportive role in the arbitral process. It requires courts to refer to 
arbitration any claim based on an arbitration agreement unless the arbitration agreement is void, inoperative or 




Noteworthy, it embodies the fundamental doctrines of Competence-competence and severability of arbitration 
clauses.
66
  In addition, the law catalogues an exhaustive list of the circumstances in which an arbitral award 
may be set aside. The list mirrors the one contained in article V of the New York Convention.  But the model 
law goes further; it recognizes the same grounds as the basis on which a court of law may decline to recognize 
and enforce an arbitral award.
67
 Incontrovertibly, the Model law was prompted by the need to promote 
international commercial arbitration and harmonize national laws on arbitration. Many countries have 
remodeled their national laws on the basis of the Model law. Sight must not be lost of the fact that the law was 
also intended to champion the use of arbitration domestically and on the international plane. The upshot of the 
foregoing discussion is that the Model Law is an improvement on the New York Convention. Although Kenya 
became a Contracting Party to the New York Convention in 1989, and has been a member of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law and was aware of the adoption of the model law in 1985, it 
was not until January 1996 that the moribund Arbitration Act was effectively abrogated following the 
promulgation of the Arbitration Act, 1995. The statute is an unimaginative replication of UNCITRAL Model 
Law. The foregoing analysis is intended to show that although Kenya has been incorporating international 
developments in  its arbitral law and effecting amendments over time, and has been involved in several 
initiatives, these developments and initiatives  have not engendered domestic arbitration as it is for the most 
part  unutilized.  The international aspects of the law have failed in enabling arbitration to carve a niche in the 
dispute resolution hierarchy in the country. 
                                                          
58
 Chapter II is devoted to the arbitration agreement. 
59
 Article 11 
60
 Article 12  
61
 Article 13 
62
 Article 16 
63
 Article 34 
64
 Article 5 
65
 Article 8. This article reproduces Article 11 (3) of the New York Convention with minor modifications. 
66
 Section 16 (1) 
67
 Article 34 
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 Statutory Framework on Arbitration in Kenya 
 
The Charter given to the Imperial British East Africa Company (I.B.E.A.) in 1888 gave the company 
administrative and economic power over what is now Kenya. Subsequently, Kenya was declared a British 
Protectorate in 1895. The last decade of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century 
witnessed an influx of settlers in Kenya and because there were no laws to govern the new Protectorate, 
English laws were transplanted to the country by Orders-in-Council 1900 and 1907.
68
 The genesis of the legal 
framework on arbitration was the Arbitration Ordinance 1914 which was a reproduction of the English 
Arbitration Act 1889.The principal attribute of this Act was that it accorded courts of law ultimate control 
over the arbitral process in Kenya. Since the court system was at its infancy then, the Arbitration Ordinance 
1914 made little if any headway in promoting resolution of disputes by arbitration. The English Parliament 
promulgated a new Arbitration Act in 1950 which repealed the Arbitration Act 1889.
69
 Disappointingly, the 
Act retained the main provisions of the Arbitration Act 1889. Most notable was Section 21 which gave courts 
of law plenary jurisdiction over arbitral processes. The section was finally repealed by the English Arbitration 
Act 1979. The Kenyan Arbitration Act 1968 retained the provision until the Act was repealed in 1995. 
 
Legal Regime under the Arbitration Act, 1968-1995 
 
The center piece of the legal framework for arbitration in Kenya has been policy, problem resolution, and the 
application of the substance of common law and the doctrines of equity as ordained by the Judicature Act, 
Chapter 8 of the laws of Kenya.
70
 African customary law has played an insignificant role in the resolution of 
land disputes. Before January 1996, the legal framework on arbitration was contained in the Arbitration Act, 
Chapter 49 Laws of Kenya.  This Act was a mirror image of the English Arbitration Act 1950 and came into 
force on November 22, 1968. The preamble to the Act was emphatic that it was “An Act of Parliament to 
make provision in relation to the settlement of differences by arbitration.”The Act defined an arbitration 
agreement as a written agreement to refer present or future differences to arbitration.
71
 The definition was 
unclear as to the character of the  required writing. This was the only definition embodied in the Act 
and has been modified by the Arbitration Act 1995.  The scope of the Act was restricted in that it could only 
be relied upon in the resolution of domestic disputes. It had no application to international disputes. 
 
Role of Courts in Arbitration  
 
One of the hallmarks of the Arbitration Act was the enormous power and latitude it gave courts of law in the 
arbitral process. The powers were too intrusive and had debilitating effects on its growth as a dispute 
resolution mechanism. The High Court had power to influence arbitral process in the following ways: (i) stay 
of proceedings; (ii) appointment of arbitrators and umpires; (iii) assist with the conduct of the reference such 
as issuing of subpoenas or compel discovery where the arbitrator had ordered it; (iv) enlargement of time for 
making award; (v) supervisory jurisdiction by removing  arbitrators, special cases, allowing appeals, extension 
of time for commencing arbitral proceedings and refusing to enforce awards that have been improperly 
obtained; and (vi) enforcement of the awards. With such panoply of powers, the arbitral process was more of a 
court process than an independent proceeding.  
 
Stay of Legal Proceedings 
 
Judicial power to stay proceedings was contained in section 6 of the Act. If a party to an arbitration agreement 
or a person is claiming through or under him instituted legal proceedings in a court of law against any other 
party to the agreement or a person claiming through or under such party, the defendant could apply for the 
proceedings to be stayed pending arbitration. The application had to be made at any time after appearance, but 
before delivery of any pleadings or taking any other steps in the proceedings. The court was obligated to 
satisfy itself that:  
 there was no sufficient reason why the matter could not be referred to arbitration in consonance with 
the agreement. 
  the applicant was ready and willing to do all things necessary for the proper conduct of the 
arbitration.  
It is apparent from the wording of the section that the application for stay could be made at any time after 
appearance.  This section guaranteed courts sufficient discretion to frustrate arbitration agreements by refusing 
to order a stay of proceedings.  
                                                          
68
 See generally YASH P. GHAI & J.P.W.B. Mc AUSLAN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA: A STUDY OF THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1970).  
69
 § 44(3)  
70
 See § 3 (1) (c) 
71
  § 2 
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There was intermittent litigation on this section. For example, In Rift Valley Textiles Ltd. V. Cotton 
Distributors Incorporated, 
72
the issues before the court coalesced around the construction of the phrase 
“arbitration agreement” in section 6(1) and “reference to arbitration” in section 6(2) of the Act. The court held 
that the former meant submission or reference to arbitration while the latter signified the actual reference of an 




The principles governing the granting of a stay of proceedings under Section 6 of the Arbitration Act were 
enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Esmailji v. Mistry Shamji Lalji & Co.
74
 The appellant had applied for a 
stay of proceedings for the dispute to be referred to arbitration in accordance with the agreement but the trial 
court declined. The applicant appealed against the decision on the ground that the court had exercised its 
discretion improperly. The Court of Appeal was unequivocal that an applicant under Section 6 of the 
Arbitration Act had to satisfy the court that he was at all times willing to do everything necessary for the 
proper conduct of arbitration. On a preponderance of evidence, the court was not persuaded that the court had 
exercised its discretion improperly. Relying on the English decision in Eleftheria,
75
 the court enunciated the 
principles applicable in determining whether to grant a stay of proceedings.
76
 Highlighting the discretion of 
the court in such cases, Madan J.A. (as he then was) observed, “Under Section 6, it lies within the discretion 
of the court whether a stay of proceedings will be ordered…the contractors successfully showed strong cause 
why the matter should not be referred to arbitration. This was not a proper case for granting a stay and the 




Another interesting Court of Appeal decision on this point is East African Power & Lighting Co Ltd. V. 
Kilimanjaro Construction Ltd,
78
 where the contract between the parties had an arbitration clause. The 
appellant had contracted with the respondent to erect transmission lines but terminated the contract without 
notice and ordered the respondent to discontinue performance. The respondent sued to collect damages for 
breach of contract. After entering appearance, the respondent applied for a stay of proceedings for the dispute 
to be referred to arbitration. The claimant opposed the application arguing that the appellant had in lieu of 
initiating arbitral proceedings elected to terminate the contract unilaterally. The appellate court held that there 
was sufficient reason not to refer the dispute to arbitration and affirmed the decision of the High Court. The 
court reasoned that since the appellant had not taken active steps to initiate arbitral proceedings, an obligation 
the law thrusts on both parties, as the court explicitly acknowledged, it had not demonstrated its readiness and 
willingness to go to arbitration.  
 
This reasoning is incompatible with the provisions of section 6 which provided that a party could apply for a 
stay of proceedings “at any time after appearance.” The court was indirectly suggesting that there should be 
no application for stay of proceedings because the applicant ought to take active steps by referring the dispute 
to arbitration in the first place. The court was in fact exacerbating the onerous burden of proof exacted on the 
applicant by the law. In the words of Madan JA  
 
“Before the court will exercise its discretion and make an order staying the proceedings, the 
applicant must satisfy the court not only that he is, but also that he was at the commencement of the 
proceedings ready and willing to do everything necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration.”  
What emerges is that the applicant must discharge the onerous burden of proof before the court can exercise 




These Court of Appeal decisions show that courts of law did not hesitate to stymie the arbitral process by 
exercising their discretion against the applicants for a stay. In our estimation, the optimal course would have 
been to allow the parties to proceed with arbitration in accordance with their agreements.  In Alividza v. L Z 
Engineering Construction Ltd, 
80
 the agreement between the parties contained an arbitration clause but the 
plaintiff instituted judicial proceedings. The defendant applied for a stay which the plaintiff resisted on the 
ground that the defendant had refused to refer the dispute to arbitration.  
                                                          
72
 (1980) KLR 56 
73
 See The Merak (1965) 1 AII E .R. 230 at 233. 
74
( 1984) KLR 150 
75
 (1969) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 237 at242  
76
(i) The court is not bound to grant the stay but has discretion to grant or not to grant (ii) the discretion to grant should not be 
exercised when strong cause for doing so is shown (iii) the burden of proving such strong cause is on the plaintiff (iv) in exercising its 
discretion, the court should take into account the circumstances of the particular case. 
77
 See RKNS v.Co. Provincial Insurance Co. Ltd.(1982) e KLR 
78
 (1983) e KLR 
79
 See Willesford v. Watson(1873) 8 Ch. App. 473  
80
 (1990) KLR 143 
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The court granted a stay. In RKNS v. Provincial Insurance Co Ltd,
81
 where the plaintiff did not initiate arbitral 
proceedings within the duration prescribed by the insurance policy and argued that the defendant had waived 
its right to plead the arbitration clause, it was held that since the defendant was not obligated to invite the 
plaintiff to refer the matter to arbitration, it was not estopped from pleading the arbitration clause. The court 
reasoned that there was no conduct on the part of the defendant to justify any waiver or estoppel.  
Unfortunately, no crystalline judicial philosophy on the construction of section 6 is decipherable. What is 
notable is that courts have in many instances exercised their illimitable discretion in a manner detrimental to 
the arbitral process. The only instance in which the court had no discretion in referring a matter to arbitration 
was where the parties to the suit applied that the matter be referred.
82
 In such circumstances, the equitable 




Special Case and Remission 
 
 The most draconian power of the High court over the arbitral process was embodied in section 22 of the Act 
which was a reduplication of section 21 of the English Arbitration Act 1950. Under this section, the court had 
jurisdiction to compel an arbitrator or umpire to state any question of law in the course of the reference or the 
award, interim award or any part of an award as a special case for the decision of the court. The court was 
vested with power to remit the matters referred, or any part thereof to the arbitrator or umpire for 
reconsideration.
84
 A decision of the court under this section was deemed to be a decree and could only be 
appealed against with leave of the High Court or Court of Appeal. The effect of this section was to 
subordinate the entire arbitral process to the High Court. 
 
Appointment and Removal of Arbitrators and Umpires 
 
The Arbitration Act conferred upon the High Court power to appoint arbitrators and umpires in certain 
circumstances at the instance of either party.
85
 Section 26 empowered the court to appoint an arbitrator or 
umpire on application by either party whenever it removed an arbitrator or umpire from office. In addition, 
this section gave the court exceptional power to declare the arbitration agreement inoperative.
86
 It had 
jurisdiction to set aside the appointment of a sole arbitrator by either party if the other party had failed to 
appoint one within seven days of receipt of the appointing party‟s notice to do so.
87
 However, good cause had 
to be shown. Curiously, the High Court had jurisdiction to convert an umpire to a sole arbitrator.
88
 The Act 
also enabled the court to remove an arbitrator or umpire for failure to use reasonable dispatch in entering on 
and proceeding with the reference and making an award.
89
 Section 24 gave the court power to remove the 





In addition to the powers outlined above, the Act empowered the High Court to, issue summons to persons 
whose attendance was required to give evidence or produce documents. Second, it had capacity to make 
orders in respect of security for costs, discovery of documents and interrogatories, the giving of evidence by 
affidavit, examination of witnesses before an officer of the court or any other person, securing the amount in 
dispute in the reference or interim injunctions or appointment of receiver.
90
Section 28 gave the court power to 
extend the time for commencement of arbitral proceedings if it was of the opinion that hardship would be 
occasioned on the part of either party. In the same vein, the court was empowered to provide relief when a 
party to the arbitration agreement sought leave to revoke the authority of the arbitrator. Moreover, it could 
grant injunctive relief to restrain the arbitrator from acting if there was evidence of partiality or the dispute 
involved questions of fraud. With regard to arbitral awards, the High Court was invested with jurisdiction to, 
enlarge the duration within which an arbitrator or umpire could make an award.
91
  
                                                          
81( 1982)e KLR 
82 See  Kihuni v. Gakunga and Another (1986) KLR 572 
83 See Lord Wilberforce in Moorgate Mercantile Co.v.Twitchings (1971) A.C. 890 at 903. 
84  §23 
85Under § 12 the power was exercisable, if the parties  could not agree who the sole arbitrator shall be  or fail to replace an arbitrator in 
the event of death or incapacity or the two arbitrators appointed by the parties fail to appoint a third arbitrator or umpire or the third 
arbitrator or umpire dies or is incapable of acting. 
86 Under § 26(2) where the authority of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire was revoked by the High Court or the sole arbitrator or 
arbitrators or an umpire who had entered on a reference was removed by the court, the court could on application order that the 
arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect with respect to the dispute referred.  
87 § 9 
88 § 10 
89 § 14 (3) 
90§  13 (4) and (5) 
91 See supra note 62 subsection 2 
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In addition, costs payable under the award were taxable in the High Court.
92
 The provisions of the Arbitration 
Act 1968 referred the setting aside of arbitral awards rather perfunctorily. Under the Act, an award could only 
be set aside if it was proved that (i) the arbitrator or umpire had misconducted
93
 himself or the proceedings or 
(ii) the arbitration or award was improperly procured.
94
 It is difficult to discern whether this provision had its 
justification on the principle of finality of arbitral awards.  Assuming that it was, then the section gave the 
High Court the unenviable task of ascertaining what these phrases meant. 
 
 One of the challenges of having an award set aside was the use of amorphous words, such as misconduct. 
Judicial authority is replete with illustrations that this term has no definitive meaning in law.
95
Its exact scope 
is difficult to ascertain. A better phrase would have been “serious irregularity.”
96
  In Muhindi & Anor v. 
Mugendo,
97
 Masime JA (as he then was) was categorical that denying a party liberty to adduce evidence 
material to the issues before the arbitral panel amounted to misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. Whereas it 
may be possible to particularize what would constitute misconduct of arbitral proceedings, it is burdensome to 
itemize how an arbitrator could misconduct himself. We endorse the notion that although the law should not 
provide for the setting aside of arbitral awards on frivolous or superficial grounds, clarity of the prescribed 
circumstances is paramount. The few reported decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal show a 
general propensity towards upholding arbitral awards.  In Kibutha v. Kibutha, for example, the High Court 
dismissed an application to set aside the arbitral award and the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision.
98
  
Lastly, the Act invested the High Court with authority to grant leave for the enforcement of local 
99
and foreign 
awards. Additionally, it prescribed specific grounds on which the court could refuse to enforce a foreign 
award.
100
 Section 33 (1) of the Act placed a formidable burden on applicants who sought to enforce foreign 
awards. Strikingly, it also gave the court power to re-open the dispute at the instigation of the respondent.
101
 
Judicial attitude on the enforcement of awards espouse the jurisprudence of non-interference other than in the 
interest of justice.
102
 As early as 1967, the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa had articulated the basic 
principles in Rashid Moledina v. Hoima Ginners, where Duffus JA observed: 
 
“Generally speaking, the courts will be slow to interfere with the award in an arbitration 
having regard to the fact that the parties to the dispute have chosen this method of settling their 
dispute and having agreed to be bound by the arbitrator‟s decision, but the courts will do so whenever 




In this case, the court intervened on the premise that the arbitrator based the award on a misapprehension of 
the law. Similar sentiments were expressed by Justice Nyarangi (as he then was) in Re Jaswantrai Aggarwal 
& Anor, 
104
 where an applicant who was dissatisfied with the arbitral award contended that the arbitrator had 
not only misconducted the proceedings but had also acted in an ultra vires manner. The court refused to set 
aside the award. The upshot of the foregoing paragraphs is that under the Arbitration Act, Chapter 49, Law of 
Kenya, the High court had monstrous power over many aspects of the arbitral process and conceivably, this 
not only emasculated the process but had a debilitating effect on its growth as a dispute resolution mechanism. 
 Moreover, although the Act  gave the arbitrator or umpire certain powers, such as administering oath to 
witnesses
105
, applying to the court for extension of time to make an award as well as power to order specific 
performance of contracts other than those relating to immovable property, it did not recognize arbitration as a 
profession. It had no definition of the term arbitrator and prescribed no qualifications, duties, powers or 
liability of arbitrators. For many years, only retired judges and members of the London Institute of Arbitrators 
could act as arbitrators. The Arbitration Act, Chapter 49, Law of Kenya did not recognize the basic principles 
of Competence- competence and separability of the arbitration clause. 
 
Law Making Power Section 37 of the Act conferred upon the Chief Justice power to make laws to facilitate 
the arbitral process. However, the power was so circumscribed that the Chief Justice could only make rules of 
the court in relation to challenging or filing of awards, hearing of special cases, staying of any suit or 
proceedings instituted in contravention of the arbitration agreement or all proceedings in court.  
                                                          
92 § 25 (1) and (2) 
93 § 23 (2) Arbitration Act, 1950 
94 § 24 (2) 
95 See HALSBURYS LAWS OF ENGLAND, 4th Edition Vol.2 at 622. The definition given has been criticized for being too wide. 
96 This phrase was considered by Donaldson J. in Thomas Borthwick v. Faure Fairclough (1968) 1 Lloyd‟s Rep.16 at. 29. 
97 (1991) KLR 78 
98 (1984) KLR 244 
99 § 27 
100 § 33 
101 Id. Sub-section 2 
102 See JUDITH G. & MATHEW G., RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION, 352 (2007).       
103Supra note 9 at 650 
104 (1976-8) KLR 1650 
§ 13 (3) 
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Arguably, the Chief Justice had no statutory power to promote arbitration. It is noteworthy that both legally 
and administratively, the Chief Justice enjoys immense power and has capacity to influence the administration 
of justice generally. The holder of the office has wide latitude to promote arbitration by urging courts to 
implore parties to disputes to explore the possibility. Such a requirement would have become a full grown rule 
of the court. For the over 27 odd years that the Arbitration Act was the operative statute, the arbitral process 
remained in the shadows of litigation and no significant attempts were made to promote its employment  in 
dispute resolution. It is plausible to argue that provisions and omissions of the Act played a central role in 
discouraging the exploitation of arbitration for a long time in Kenya. The fact that the statute disregarded 
international commercial arbitration is to some extent indicative of the lukewarm support the legislature had 
for the arbitral process. However, in 1995, Kenya adopted the UNCITRAL Model law and the New York 
Convention under the Arbitration Act (Act No 4 of 1995) which abrogated the Arbitration Act 1968. The Act 
came into force on January 2nd 1996. 
 
Legal regime under the Arbitration Act 1995 
 
Although the imperfections of the Arbitration Act, Cap 49 Laws of Kenya, were glaring for a longtime, the 
legislature took no meaningful steps to ameliorate the situation.  Even after the annunciation of the Model law 
on international commercial arbitration by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) in June 1985, the legislature demonstrated lack of enlightenment by failing to appreciate the 
benefits of adopting such progressive laws without delay. The crusade for a new Arbitration Act which was 
spearheaded by the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) did not come to fruition until December 
1995 when the Arbitration Act (Act No 4 of 1995) (herein after referred to as the “Act”) was promulgated. It 
is for all intents and purposes a replica of the UNCITRAL Model law on international commercial arbitration 
albeit with a few modifications that generally reflects the domestication of the country‟s obligations under the 
New York Convention. Having embraced such a law and domesticated the New York Convention, Kenya 
could be regarded as having a fairly modern legal system on arbitration and enforcement of awards.  
 
The preamble of the statute states succinctly that it is “An Act of Parliament to repeal and re-enact with 
amendments the Arbitration Act and to provide for connected purposes.” Although these words are broad 
enough, a more comprehensive statute had been envisioned. One of the most conspicuous deficiencies of the 
Act is that it does not recognize ADR. Its title is a graphic exemplification of this fact.
106
 However, to give 
credit where it is deserved, the Act was an improvement of the previous statute. Among its salient attributes 
are clarity and simplicity. This is partly attributable to the fact that the parliamentary draftsperson played an 
insignificant role in its adoption as it was a plain reproduction of existing material.  For the first time, the law 
provided for international commercial arbitration.
107
 It is inexplicable why it took this long to assimilate such 
forward looking principles into a domestic statute. This is perhaps because there was no comprehensive policy 
on the place of arbitration and ADR in the domain of dispute resolution. 
 
Unlike the previous Act whose interpretation section contained a single definition, the new Act embodies 
several definitions, including, arbitration, party, arbitral award and a few others.
108
 However, the definition of 
the term “arbitration” is nebulous.
109
 The Act defines an arbitration agreement as “an agreement by the parties 
to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or may arise between them in respect of a 
defined legal relationship whether contractual or not.” In the same breath, the Act, does not insist that the 
contract must be written. However, there is some incongruence between the interpretation section and the 
provisions of section 4(2) which ordain that an arbitration agreement must be written.  The apparent 
contradiction between these sections may be reconciled by postulating that while an  oral agreement to submit 
disputes to arbitration is valid and enforceable at common law, it is not an arbitration agreement in the context 
of section 4 (2) of the Arbitration Act. The provisions of the Act reflect the flexible character of arbitral 
proceedings which is predicated on the principle of party autonomy. It has aptly been observed that “an 
integral part of supporting party autonomy is the recognition of the rule and importance of arbitral 
institutions.”
110
 The Arbitration Act confers plenary powers on the parties to the arbitral process which 
accentuates the principle of party autonomy and the private character of the arbitral process. The Act gives 
full recognition and effect to the agreement between the parties to arbitrate according to the institutions. 
                                                          
106 § 1 of the Act provides that: “This Act may be cited as the Arbitration Act.” Expectations were that Act would at least recognize 
conciliation. 
107 § 2 
108 § 3 
109 Arbitration means “any arbitration whether or not administered by a permanent institution” 
110 JOHN T. & ARTHUR M., BERNSTEIN‟S HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE 33 
(4th Ed. 2003).  
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For instance, the Act does not prescribe a fixed and certain procedure for the arbitral process. On the contrary, 
it encourages the parties and the arbitrator to adopt procedures appropriate to their circumstances subject only 
to the rules of natural justice. This policy is in accord with international practice. Most of the powers of the 
arbitral tribunal are default powers. The other attribute is that the parties are free to organize their proceedings 
as they desire.
111
 They are free to appoint the arbitral tribunal directly or indirectly as long as they agree. 
Additionally, the Act recognizes the cardinal principle of arbitral proceedings i.e. equal treatment of the 
parties and giving each party full opportunity to present its case.
112
 Furthermore, the Act prohibits the court 
from interfering with the arbitral process except in the circumstances specifically provided by the Act.
113
 This 
is intended to discourage the use of the residue powers conferred on courts by other domestic statutes. 
 
This statement of principle is a clear manifestation of the policy of party autonomy underlying the Act and the 
desire to limit and define the role of courts in the arbitral process so as to give effect to the policy.
114
 
Importantly, the Act recognizes the fundamental principle of Competence-competence and the doctrine of 
severability of the arbitral clause. Admittedly, although the Act did away with the more meddlesome powers 
of the court in the arbitral process, it retained innumerable instances in which courts of law have a substantial 
role to play in the arbitral process. For example,  the High Court retains jurisdiction to: (i) grant interim 
measures,
115
 (ii) stay judicial proceedings,
116
 (iii) hear a challenge on the question whether the arbitral tribunal 
has jurisdiction in the matter
117
, (iv) assist in taking evidence,
118
 (iv) set aside the arbitral award,
119
 (v) 
recognize and enforce awards,
120
 (vi) hear an appeal on questions of law,
121
 (vii) and appoint  arbitrators.
122
 
A rather surprising innovation of the Act is that it fashions a new role for the office of the Attorney General 
something not envisaged by the former Act.
123
 It is incomprehensible why a supposedly progressive statute 
would subject the arbitral process to the vagaries of officialdom.  Under Article 13 of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law from which this section is extracted, the power is vested in the court. It would be imprudent to argue that 
the Attorney General could vest the mandate to decide the challenge on any other body whose decision would 
be final. By subjecting arbitral proceedings to the bureaucracy of the office of the Attorney General, this 
section does not espouse the arbitral process.  
 
The High Court has decided several cases on different aspects of the Arbitration Act 1995 and to its credit it 
has generally enforced arbitration clauses in accordance with the desires of the parties.
124
 However, only a 
handful of decisions have been appealed against in the Court of Appeal for a more authoritative interpretation 
of the Act. 
 
Powers of the Court 
 
Although courts have no inherent jurisdiction to control the arbitral process, there are countless instances in 
which the Arbitration Act 1995 permits their intervention at the instigation of the parties.  
 
Stay of Legal Proceedings 
 
Where there is an arbitration agreement and a dispute arises, one of the parties may in disregard of the 
arbitration agreement institute judicial proceedings. The other party may apply to the court in which the 
proceedings have been commenced to stay the proceedings for the dispute to be referred to arbitration. The 
court is required to grant a stay unless the provisions of section 6 of the Arbitration Act apply. We shall 
reproduce the salient parts of section 6 to demonstrate the modifications it has undergone and evince how 
courts have interpreted it. The section provides, inter alia: 
  
                                                          
111  §§ 20-24 
112  § 19 
113 § 10  
114 DAVID J. S. JUDITH G & MATHEW G. RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION 293 (2003). 
115 § 7 
116 § 6 
117 § 17 
118 § 28 
119 § 35 
120 § 36-37 
121 §  39 
122 § 12 
123 Under §14 of the Act, parties are free to agree on a procedure for challenging an arbitrator failing which the party challenging the arbitrator must 
within 15 days of becoming aware of the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the circumstances justifying rise the challenge notify the arbitral 
tribunal. Unless the arbitrator being challenged withdraws or the other party agrees, to the challenge, the arbitral tribunal is required to determine the 
challenge. If the challenge fails, the party may within 30 days of receipt of notice of the failure apply to the competent authority designated by the 
Attorney General whose decision is final. 
124 In William Oluande v. American Life Insurance Co. (Kenya) Ltd (2006)eKLR the defendant had resisted all attempts by the plaintiff to refer the 
dispute between them to arbitration as ordained by the agreement. The court referred the matter to arbitration. See also Don- Woods Co. Ltd v. Kenya 
Pipeline Co. Ltd  (2005) e KLR ; Seca  Africa ltd v. KirLoskar Kenya Ltd & 3 Others (2005) e KLR  
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“A court before which proceedings are brought in a matter which is the subject of an 
arbitration agreement shall, if a party applies not later than the time when that party enters appearance 
or files any pleadings or takes any other step, stay the proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration 
unless: (a) the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed or 
there is in fact no dispute between the parties with regard to the matters agreed to be referred to 
arbitration.” 
 
Parties have liberty to commence or continue with arbitration notwithstanding the pendency in court of an 
application for a stay of proceedings. Part of this section is a reproduction of Article II (3) of the New York 
Convention. The current formulation modifies the previous section significantly. Previously, an application 
for a stay could be made at any time after the applicant had entered appearance in the proceedings. Under its 
current formulation, the application cannot be made after entering appearance.
125
 The jurisprudence in this 
area of law is that a party ought to make the application immediately after filing the memorandum of an 
appearance.
126
 The Court of Appeal has been unequivocal on this point
127
 and underscored it in Niazsons (K) 
Ltd v. China Road & Bridge Corporation.
128
 The contract between the parties contained an arbitration clause. 
When the appellant sued the respondent in damages for breach, the respondent entered appearance but did not 
file a defense and proceeded to apply for a stay of the proceedings. The application was declined on the 
ground that it had been made after entering appearance contrary to the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. It is 
pertinent to observe that the Section restricts the discretion of the High Court to decline an application for a 
stay of proceedings. As the Court of Appeal rightly acknowledged in Charles Njogu Lofty v. Bedouin 
Enterprises Ltd
129
, the Section is couched in mandatory terms. It was held that a court should only decline an 
application to stay proceedings if there was overwhelming circumstances militating against it.
130
 The court 
was authoritative on the steps an applicant must take in order to be entitled to a stay of proceedings. Critically 
important, the application must be made promptly and the court must decipher the following:  
 
 whether the applicant has taken any step in the proceedings other than those permitted by the Act;  
 whether there are any legal impediments on the validity, operation or performance of the arbitration 
agreement; and  
  whether the suit concerns matters agreed to be referred. 
 
 An unwarranted question has arisen as to who among the parties to the proceedings can invoke the provisions 
of Section 6(1) of the Act. The Section uses the phrase “…if a party applies not later than the time when that 
party enters appearance or files any pleadings…” These words appear to suggest that only a person who is 
required to enter an appearance in the proceedings can apply for a stay under this section. 
 
In Majidoon Kenya Ltd v.Kenya Old Co Ltd,
131
 Justice Fred Ochieng posited that the right to apply for a stay 
of proceedings was not exclusively vested on the defendant or respondent. He suggested that there was no bar 
on the plaintiff to seek a stay of proceedings which he has instituted. It is difficult to follow the reasoning of 
the learned judge as he does not focus on the question of interpretation of the wording of the section. 
Although this would signify a change of mind on the part of the plaintiff and could facilitate arbitral 
jurisdiction, it is inconceivable that such application can be made in compliance with the provisions of Section 
6 (1) of the Act. This is principally because the plaintiff does not enter appearance in civil proceedings. In 
Pamela Akora Imeje v. Akore ITC International Ltd & Bart Jan Roze Boom,
132
 the plaintiff applied for a stay 
of proceedings for the dispute to be referred to arbitration but the High Court declined on the premise that 
Section 6(1) could only be invoked by the defendant.  
                                                          
125 See Tread Setters Tire Ltd v. Elite Earth Movers Ltd. (2007) e KLR, Kisumu Walla Industry Ltd v. Pan Asiatic Commodities PTE 
Ltd. And Another (1995-98) EALR 150, where it was held that a defendant who filed a defense in a matter dependent on an agreement 
providing for arbitration clause waived his right to ask for arbitration. 
126 Nambuye J in Agricultural  Finance Corporation Agricultural Development Corporation v.Lutsman & Co. (1990) Ltd. (2004)e 
KLR 
127 In Corporate Insurance Ltd v. Loise Wanjiru Wachira (2003) e KLR the court observed:  “While we agree with the proposition that 
a Scott v. Avery arbitration clause can provide a defense to a claim, we cannot accept the submission that the party relying on it can 
circumvent the statutory requirement to apply for a stay of proceedings. In the present case, if the appellant wished to take the benefit 
of the clause, it was obliged to apply for a stay after entering appearance and before delivering any pleadings. By filing a defense, the 
appellant lost its right to rely on the clause,” See also MUSTILL and BOYD: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 165 (2nd Ed. 2004).  
128 (2001) KLR. 12 
129 (2005) e KLR 
130 In Achells Kenya Ltd v. Phillips Medical Systems Nederland B.V. Diederik Zeven (2007)eKLR, Justice R.N. Nambuye construed 
the term “shall” as a command.  
131( 2006 )e KLR 
132 (2007) e KLR 
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Justice Hatari Waweru was categorical that: “That provision is available only to the defendants. The very 
wording of the sub-section makes this plain and obvious. Having made her bed, as it were, the plaintiff must 
lie on it. She chose to file suit, she must fall or stand on it.” It is our submission that the reasoning of Justice 




Other than the filing of a defense which acts as a waiver of the respondents‟ right to seek a stay of proceedings 
under section 6(1) of the Act, the Court of Appeal has yet to enunciate other circumstances that would estop a 
party to an arbitration agreement from making the application.
134
 The closest the High Court has come was the 
decision in Timothy Rintari v. Madison Insurance Co Ltd, 
135
 where the plaintiff had invoked the arbitration 
clause in the agreement but the defendant declined. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced proceedings in the 
High Court and the defendant applied for a stay of the proceedings. The court struck off the application 
holding that the defendant was estopped by his conduct from relying on the provisions of section 6(1) of the 
Act.  
 
As indicated elsewhere, the pendency of an application for a stay of proceedings does   not interfere with the 
arbitral process under the Act. The Court of Appeal has enforced this provision strictly to give effect to 
arbitral proceedings. In Joab Henry Onyango Omino v. Lalji Megji Patel & Co Ltd, 
136
 the pertinent question 
was whether the defendant was still obligated to file a defense in the suit after making the application for a 
stay of proceedings. The court was unambiguous that Section 6 of the Act did not permit parallel proceedings 
to be dealt with simultaneously. Once the application for a stay of proceedings is made, the respondent‟s duty 
to file a defense is deferred. The court justified its decision on the ground that public policy discountenanced 
concurrent proceedings before two or more fora. In summation, a compelling argument may be made that the 
modifications of Section 6 of the Arbitration Act 1995 ameliorated the burden of proof imposed on the 
applicant by the Arbitration Act 1968. But more importantly; it reduced judicial discretion in the 




In addition to the power to stay judicial proceedings, the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere or play a 
supportive role in the arbitral process. For example, under section 7 of the Act, the Court has jurisdiction to 
issue interim orders, such as an injunction at the instance of either party. This may be justified by the need to 
maintain the status quo pending the determination of the dispute. To the credit of this provision, the court 
relies on any finding of fact made by the arbitral tribunal on the issues before the court. Similarly, the High 
Court may on application of the arbitral tribunal or either party with sanction of the tribunal order a party to 




With regard to appointment of arbitrators, the court can intervene at the option of the parties but only in the 
circumstances prescribed by section 12 of the Act and the court‟s decision is final.
138
 Without belaboring the 
point, this section is facilitative of the arbitral process. Closely allied to this power is the competence of the 
High Court to determine any question arising in the event of termination of the mandate of the arbitral 
tribunal.
139
 Section 17 confers jurisdiction to hear an application challenging decisions of the arbitral tribunal 
on preliminary questions and the court‟s decision is final.
140
 A further supportive role of the High Court is 
embodied in section 28 of the Act. This section mandates the court to assist in taking of evidence if an 
application to that effect is made by the arbitral tribunal or either party with countenance of the tribunal. The 
High Court may execute the request within its competence and according to its rules of taking evidence. 
Although the court is not constrained to act, this provision is inherently supportive of the arbitral process. The 
fact that the arbitral tribunal ultimately determines the course of action is illustrative of an approbation of the 
principle of autonomy of the parties and mandate of the arbitral tribunal.  
 
One of the ingenuities of the Act in connection with the exercise of these powers by the High Court is that 
applications under the various sections do not defer arbitral proceedings. Regrettably, there is no judicial 
authority from which to expound the jurisprudence emerging from the exercise of the powers exemplified 
above. 
                                                          
133 See ENID A. M. & GILL: THE LAW OF ARBITRATION, 8 (2001) ; See also Supra note 105 at 300 
134 In Bahari Transport Company v. A.P.A. Insurance Co. Ltd, the defendant had filed a defense and then applied for a stay of 
proceedings. The High Court dismissed it with costs. 
135 (2005) eKLR 
136 (1999)KLR  574 
 137§18 
138 § 12 (5) 
139 §15 
140 § 17 (7) 
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Setting Aside of Arbitral Awards 
 
In accord with the philosophy of the UNCITRAL Model law,
141
 and the principle of finality of arbitral awards, 
the Arbitration Act provides only one method of challenging an arbitral award in a court of law. This can only 
be by an application to the High Court for the award to be set aside. Section 35(2) enumerates the 
circumstances in which an arbitral award may be set aside. Superfluously, this section is a carbon copy of 
Article 34 of the Model law, and Article V of the New York Convention which sets forth the grounds on 
which recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused. The only difference between section 
35(2) of the Act and Article V is that whereas the former applies to domestic awards, the latter applies to 
foreign awards. This section is deficient in originality. For example, it fails to recognize that serious 
procedural irregularities could affect an arbitral award.
142
 The party seeking to have the arbitral award set 
aside must rely on at least one of the circumstances recapitulated by the section.  But over and above the 
circumstances recited by section 35(2), the High Court has jurisdiction to set aside an arbitral award if it is 
satisfied that the award is in conflict with the “public policy of Kenya” or the subject matter of the dispute 
was not capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of Kenya. The judicial philosophy emerging from 
the application of section 35(2) is that courts are generally disinclined from interfering with arbitral awards 
predominantly on the grounds of public policy. And as we proceed to illustrate, the Court of Appeal has been 
unambiguous in several seminal cases that precept of public policy ordain that there should be an end to 
litigation.  
 
Before analyzing how courts have applied section 35(2) of the Act, it is imperative to acknowledge that the 
phrase “public policy” used by the section is problematic as it is not amenable to an absolute definition.
143
 In 
years of yore, it was branded an “unruly horse and when you get astride it, you never know where it will carry 
you.”
144
 English Courts have interpreted the phrase to include, fraud, illegality, bribery and other forms of 
corruption.
145
 The question of what constitutes “public policy of Kenya” was addressed in fairly sufficient 
detail by Justice Ringera in Christ of All Nations v. Apollo Insurance Co Limited.
146
 The court conceded the 
nebulous character of the phrase and affirmed that its meaning vacillated with the circumstances of the case. 
The court observed: 
“A comparison between the two pieces of legislation underscores an important 
message introduced by the latter, (Arbitration Act 1995) the finality of disputes and a severe 
limitation of access to court. Sections 6, 10, 12, 15, 17, 18, 28, 35 and 39 of the Act are 
particularly relevant in that regard. This message we think is a pointer to the public policy the 
country takes at this stage of its development. Public policy which is a factor we may consider 
in the exercise of our discretion is of course an indeterminate principle or doctrine… it is 
variable and must fluctuate with the circumstances of the time.”  
 
In this case, the appellant company sought to have an arbitral award set aside on the ground that the arbitrators 
had exceeded their mandate. Both the High Court and Court of Appeal were satisfied that there was no 
compelling reason to interfere. The former dismissed the application to set aside while the latter disallowed 
the appeal. The Court of Appeal predicated its decision on public policy reasoning that the provisions of the 
Arbitration Act accentuated the policy that there should be an end to litigation. In the same breath, the court 
emphasized the finality of arbitral awards. It was categorical that; “in this case, the decision was final.” The 
fact that public policy oscillates with the circumstances of the time may or may not portend well for the 
arbitral process as it leaves the matter open to the court‟s interpretation of the circumstances.
147
 As mentioned 
above, arbitral awards are final unless set aside under the provisions of section 35 of the Arbitration Act. This 
explains the lack of enthusiasm by courts to interfere with them. In order to succeed, the applicant must satisfy 
the stringent requirements imposed by the Act. An applicant must strictly bring himself within the provisions 
of section 35 or fail. While underscoring the finality of arbitral awards in Transworld Safaris Ltd v. Eagle 
Aviation & 3 Ors,
148
  Justice Nyamu observed; “Awards have now gained considerable international 
recognition and courts especially, commercial ones have the responsibility to ensure that the arbitral autonomy 
is safeguarded by the court as arbitral awards are surely and gradually acquiring the nature of a convertible 
currency due to their finality.” 
                                                          
141 Article 34 
142 The UK Arbitration Act 1996 provides for the challenging of arbitral awards on the ground of serious irregularities. 
143 Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229 
144 Id. 
145 JUDITH & MATHEW supra note 103 at 389.  
146 (2002) 2 E A 336. According to the judge, an act is contrary to public policy if it was either (a) inconsistent with the constitution or other laws of 
Kenya whether written or unwritten (b) inimical to the national interests of Kenya (c) contrary to justice or morality. 
147 See Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229. See also Ransley J in Giovanni Gaida and 79 Others v. Mahican Investment Limited and 4 Others 
(2005)e KLR 
148 (2003)e KLR 
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In Giovanni Gaida & Ors v. Mohican Investment Limited & Ors,
149
 the learned judge was emphatic that 
judicial interference with arbitral awards should be discouraged as it effectively made the High Court a court 
of appeal in relation to awards. According to the judge, this would be inconsistent with the objects of the 
Arbitration Act 1995 which sought to bring finality to disputes between parties.  
 
 The jurisprudence of treating arbitral awards as final appears to be well embedded in judicial reasoning. The 
Court of Appeal has placed the matter beyond question in two seminal decisions involving the same appellant. 
In Kenya Shell Limited v. Kobil Petroleum Limited,
150
 a dispute between the two companies was referred to 
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the contract and the arbitral tribunal made an award in favor of the 
respondent on November 17th 2003.The applicant sought to have the award set aside on the ground that the 
arbitral tribunal had misunderstood or misapplied the law in the interpretation of the agreement, but the court 
declined. On appeal, the Court of Appeal was satisfied that the High Court had exercised its discretion 
sagaciously and affirmed the decision. The court reiterated that an arbitral award was final unless either party 
satisfied the court that there was sufficient justification to set it aside. A similar holding was made in Kenya 
Shell Limited v. Century Oil Trading Co Limited,
151
 where the appellant terminated a distributorship 
agreement with the respondent and the dispute was referred to arbitration. The arbitral tribunal made an award 
of 258 million Kenya shillings in favor of the respondent. The High Court dismissed the application to set 
aside the award and the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision. 
 
 The High Court has taken the cue from the Court of Appeal and seldom interferes with arbitral awards. The 
decision in Mahican Investment Ltd & Ors v. Giovanni Gaida & 80 Ors is a case in point. In Chrysanthus B. 
Okemo v. APA Insurance Co Ltd,
152
 the respondent applied for the award to be set aside but the High Court 
declined. A further application to have the award varied failed.  
 
A rather interesting holding was in Pentecostal Assemblies of God v. Reverend John Malwenyi & Ors.
153
 The 
applicant sought to have the award set aside on the premise that it had no date, signatures of all arbitrators, 
designation of the place where it was made and no reasons had been given. The court upheld the award. This 
holding is incomprehensible bearing in mind that the Arbitration Act is explicit that an arbitral award must not 
only be written but must be dated and signed by all arbitrators or a majority of them.
154
 Moreover, it must state 
the place of arbitration and the reasons upon which it is based. The judge makes no attempt to determine the 
legal effect of noncompliance with the Act and its effect on the case. These judicial authorities demonstrate 
that so great is the proclivity towards upholding arbitral awards that courts extraordinarily 
interfere.
155
However, courts have not hesitated to set aside an arbitral award if it was shown that there was 
sufficient legal justification to do so. For instance, in Siginon Maritime Ltd v. Gitutho Associate & Ors,
156
 
where the arbitral tribunal failed to keep a written record of the proceedings contrary to the agreement 
between the parties to the arbitration agreement, the court was persuaded that the failure vitiated the arbitral 
award and it was set aside.  
 
A further hurdle an applicant has to surmount appertains to time. The application to set aside may not be made 
after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making the application received the arbitral 
award or if a request had been made under section 36, from the date on which the request was disposed of by 
the arbitral tribunal.
157
 Although the section is couched in non-mandatory terms, courts have construed it 
strictly. The section has been interpreted to mean that an application to set aside cannot be made after three 
months have elapsed from the date the applicant was notified that the arbitral award was ready for 
collection.
158
 According to the High Court, the words “delivery” and “receipt” used in sections 32(5) and 36 
respectively, have similar meanings. Any other construction would introduce unnecessary delay and deny the 
arbitral process the virtue of finality.  The upshot of this interpretation is that the person wishing to set aside 
an arbitral award cannot wait indefinitely before collecting it.
159
 In Giovanni Gaida & Ors v. Mahican 
Investment & Ors, the court applied this interpretation and held that the applicant had not discharged the 
burden of proof imposed by the section.  
                                                          
149 Id. 
150 Supra note 136 
151 (2008)e KLR 
152 (2006) e KLR 
153 (2006)e KLR 
154 § 32 
155 See Tekie Michael t/a speedy Studio v. UPA Provincial Company Ltd (2006) e KLR 
156 (2005)e KLR 
157 § 35 (3) 
158 See Nyamu J, supra note 138 
159 See Bulk Transport Corporation v. Sissy Steamship Co. Ltd (1979) 2 Lloyds Rep. 289. See also Nyamu J in supra note 138.  
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The learned judge wrongly asserted that in order to succeed, the applicant had to show “beyond doubt” that 
the arbitrator had gone on a frolic of his or her own to deal with matters not related to the subject matter of the 
dispute. Although the judge could not have been insinuating that the standard of proof is similar to that in 
criminal cases, the use of the phrase “beyond doubt” is puzzling. In the final analysis, it is arguable that courts 
of law have played an instrumental role in giving effect to the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1995 in 
conformity with the principle of finality of arbitral awards. They have generally been unrelenting in upholding 
arbitral awards thus emphasizing the autonomous character of the arbitral process. 
 
 Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
 
The Arbitration Act recognizes all arbitral awards as binding and provides for their enforcement by the High 
Court. The party seeking to enforce the award must lodge a formal application which must be accompanied by 
(a) the duly authenticated original award or certified copy; (b) the original arbitration agreement or certified 
copy; and (c) a certified translation of the arbitration agreement if it is not in the English language.
160
 Rule 
4(1) of the Arbitration Rules 1997 is explicit that any party may file an arbitral award in the High Court. The 
filing must be notified to all other parties and if no application to set aside the award is made, the applicant 
may apply ex parte by summons for leave for confirmation of the award as a decree. Whereas the Act 
prescribes no other requirements, an arbitral award will not be recognized as binding or be enforced if any of 
the circumstances set forth by section 37 apply. Section 37 replicates section 35(2) of the Act. 
 
 Judicial authority is unqualified that as long as the relevant provisions of the Act have been complied with, an 
arbitral award will be enforced. Courts have also affirmed that the provisions of section 36 are mandatory.
161
 
Several decisions of the High Court illustrate this position. For instance, in Adrian Mambili Meja v. Trident 
Insurance Company Ltd,
162
 the applicant had sought leave to enforce an arbitral award as a decree of the court 
under section 36 of the Act and Rules 4 and 6 of the Arbitration Rules 1997. In summation, Justice Waweru 
observed, “I am satisfied that all the necessary provisions of law have been complied with.” A similar holding 
was made in Francis K. Hinga v. George B. Nyanja.
163
  In Structural Construction Co. Ltd v. International 
Islamic Relief,
164
 the applicants sought the reading and recognition of an arbitral award under the provisions of 
the Arbitration Act and Rule 6 of the Arbitration Rules. The defendant objected alleging that it had not been 
heard by the arbitral tribunal. The court dismissed the argument and recognized the award as binding. 
 
On the other hand, courts have not hesitated to repudiate attempts to enforce arbitral awards in circumstances 
in which the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the refusal was justifiable in law. In Busuru 
Richard Mark t/a Busuru R. M. & Partners Architects v. Nzoia Sugar Company Ltd,
165
 the applicant sought to 
have the arbitral award recognized as binding and adopted as a judgment of the court but neither the 
arbitration agreement nor the award had been annexed to the application as required by section 36 of the Act. 
The application was dismissed with costs. The court was of the view that the section 36(2) was mandatory. 
Similarly, in Kenfit Ltd v. Consolata Fathers,
166
 the plaintiff applied for an order to enforce an arbitral award 
as a judgment of the court. The defendant claimed that the award was incomplete as the arbitrator had not 
provided for costs. The court was satisfied that the application was premature because the arbitrator had not 
determined all the questions referred to him including the matter of costs.  
 
These decisions authenticate the argument that courts have endeavored to enforce arbitral awards in 
accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. It is informational to point out that to the extent that 
statutory provisions are not ambiguous, courts of law will enforce them in consonance with the intention of 




The Arbitration Act appears to recognize the centrality of the institution of arbitrator in the arbitral process. 
However, it does not define the term arbitrator. It instead defines the phrase “arbitral tribunal” to mean; a sole 




Section 12 provides for the appointment of arbitral tribunals.
167
 Amazingly, there are no statutory restrictions 
on the person who may be appointed arbitrator.  
                                                          
160 § 36 (1)  & (2) 
161 See Osiemo J in  Busuru Richard Mark t/a Busuru R.M. &  Partners Architects v. Nzoia Sugar Company Ltd (2007) e KLR 
162 (2005) e KLR 
163 (2006) e KLR. See also Ernie Campbell and Company Ltd v. Githunguri Dairy Plant Co. Ltd (2005) e KLR 
164 (2007)e KLR 
165 Supra note 154 
166 (2005) e KLW 
167 This may be by the parties or a third party as agreed upon by the parties or the High Court on application by either party. 
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It is ambiguous whether persons who are not of full legal capacity, for instance, infants, persons of unsound 
mind and corporations can be appointed. Similar doubts exist about persons who have been declared bankrupt. 
The Act does not recognize arbitration as a profession although it is increasingly becoming common for some 
individuals to practice exclusively as arbitrators. It is a feature of the Kenyan arbitral process that non-lawyers 
may become arbitrators in specialized fields. It is maintained that since the arbitral tribunal derives its 
mandate from the contract between the parties who have complete freedom to choose their tribunal, there is no 
need for minimum qualifications. In fact it is further postulated that the powers of the arbitral tribunal are 
subject to the agreement between the parties. While this hypothesis is sustainable in so far as the scope of the 
arbitration agreement is concerned, it is untenable as it obfuscates the underlying argument that the 
Arbitration Act contains no general statement on the duties or obligations of arbitral tribunals. 
 
It is axiomatic that arbitration involves professional training, discipline, independence responsibility, integrity, 
expertise and commitment to certain appropriate values. These are attributes generally peculiar to 
professionals. Arguably, arbitrators have every right to be considered as professionals in the field of dispute 
resolution. In our view, recognizing arbitration as a profession would be a significant paradigmatic shift that 
would not only enhance the profile of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism but would herald an epoch 
of accountability and greater utilization of the arbitral process. Additionally, it would provide the necessary 
institutional framework to popularize arbitration and ADR. 
 
Despite the fact that impartiality of arbitrators is elemental to the entire arbitration process,
168
 the closest that 
the Arbitration Act comes to imposing a substantive duty on the arbitral tribunal is section 19 which provides 
inter alia: “parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given full opportunity of presenting 
his case.” The significance of this provision is among other things that an arbitral tribunal must not receive 
evidence or argument from one party in the absence of the other.
169
 Although this formulation is consistent 
with the UNCITRAL Model Law, it is important to recall that this was a framework convention which could 
not have been expected to be exhaustive in every respect.  States adopting the Model law are free to modify 
and supplement its articles for more inclusivity and relevance to local circumstances. The Act imposes no 
general duty on the arbitral tribunal to act fairly and impartially or avoid conflict of interest or unnecessary 
delay or expense. There is no positive duty to use reasonable dispatch in conducting the proceedings or 
making the award. Parties are free to impose upon arbitral tribunals whatever time limit they may deem 
appropriate for completion of the arbitral proceedings and making of the award. The arbitral tribunal is duty 
bound to adhere to any timetable agreed upon. In the absence of an agreement, the Arbitration Act imposes no 
specific time frame within which the award may be made. The consequence of any delay by an arbitral 
tribunal is negative. The High Court has jurisdiction to remove dilatory arbitral tribunals.
170
 Moreover, there is 
no explicit duty on the part of the arbitral tribunal to attend hearings and participate or not to exceed its 
jurisdiction or power. Similarly, there is no obligation to conduct arbitral proceedings in accordance with the 
procedure agreed upon by the parties
171
 or even deal with all the issues raised. Although section 30 provides 
that in the absence of an agreement between the parties the decision shall be made by a majority of the 
arbitrators, it imposes no duty on the tribunal to act judicially, make an award or even ensure that the award is 
neither ambiguous nor uncertain. It is our presupposition that had the Act imposed these as minimum duties 
on arbitral tribunals, arbitration would have been more entrenched in the dispute resolution matrix in the 
country. 
 
 Liability of Arbitrators 
 
The Laws of Kenya have long recognized the traditional principle that judicial officers are immune from suit 
at the instance of a dissatisfied litigant or accused in criminal proceedings. This practice engenders 
independence of the judiciary. Doubt exists on whether this principle applies to arbitrators. The Arbitration 
Act is silent on whether arbitral tribunals enjoy immunity for acts and omissions committed or omitted in the 
course of the arbitral process.
172
 In the United Kingdom, arbitrators enjoy statutory immunity for their acts and 
omissions, but may be sued for professional negligence.
173
 It is arguable that extending this principle to 
arbitration would enable arbitral tribunals‟ discharge their obligations more effectively as it would protect 
them from harassment by frivolous and vexatious actions.  
                                                          
168 See generally supra note 104 
169 See Renown Investments v. Mecca Leisure (1984) 271 E.G. 989 CA. 
170 § 15 (1) (a) 
171 § 20 (1) of the Arbitration Act is explicit that parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in the conduct of the 
proceedings. However, the section is silent on whether the arbitral tribunal is bound by the procedure. The duty can however be implied because under 
the provisions of section 35 (2), an arbitral award may be set aside if the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. See 
Joseph  W.Karanja & Another v. Geoffrey Ngari Kuria (2006) e KLR   
172 § 29  of the Arbitration Act 1996 
173 See DAVID  JUDITH  & MATHEW supra note 114 at 176 
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Additionally, it would reinforce impartiality and independence. According to Lord Morris in Sutcliff v. 
Thackrah,
174
 the fact that the arbitrator‟s functions are judicial in character is sufficient to confer immunity. It 
is our contention that extending immunity to arbitral tribunals would undoubtedly strengthen the arbitral 
process. 
 
Relief and Remedies  
 
The Arbitration Act 1995 is inarticulate on the character of the arbitral award. Unlike the Arbitration Act, 
Chapter 49, Laws of Kenya, which made perfunctory reference to remedies,
175
 the current Act has no explicit 
provision. It is dubitable whether parties are free to agree on the powers exercisable by arbitral tribunals with 
regard to remedies.
176
 No provision is implicit in this respect. This omission can only be understood in the 
context of the general powers of arbitral tribunals. Since the Act does not bestow upon arbitral tribunals basic 
powers such as, administration of oaths or compel attendance of witnesses or production of documents, it is 
not fortuitous that their powers in relation to remedies are not explicit. But this still begs the question. What 
remedies can an arbitral tribunal dispense?  
 
The closest that the Act comes to remedies is a stipulation that  the arbitral tribunal may at the request of a 
party  order any party to take such interim measure of protection as the arbitral tribunal may consider 
necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute.
177
 Implicitly, the order under this provision may also 
include injunctive relief. The Act should have been more elaborate on whether arbitral tribunals may make a 
declaration on matters before it, order payment of a sum of money in any currency, order a party to do or 
refrain from doing anything, order specific performance or rectification. It is redundant to observe that a 
provision on the relief and remedies would have amplified the arbitral process. It is our argument that the 
failure of the Act to affirm the powers of arbitral tribunals with regard to remedies is antithetical to the 
enhancement of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. 
 
Costs, Fees and Expenses 
 
The Arbitration Act 1995 eliminates the traditional distinction between “costs of the reference” and “costs of 
the award” by merging the two. While the former describes the costs incurred by the parties in putting their 
respective cases before the arbitral tribunal, the latter denotes the administrative costs of the reference 
including the tribunal‟s fees and expenses.
178
 The two types of costs were an integral part of the previous 
legislation.
179
Under the relevant provision, unless the parties otherwise agreed, such costs were at the 
discretion of the arbitrator and were taxable in the High Court.
180
Surprisingly, the previous legislation 
rendered any provision to the effect that the parties or any party to the agreement would bear their own or its 
own costs of the reference or of the award or any part thereof void. The above phraseology has been replaced 
by section 32 of the Arbitration Act which uses the phrase “costs and expenses of arbitration” to signify the 
legal and other expenses of the parties, expenses of the arbitral tribunal and any other expenses in the 
arbitration. None of these terms is defined by the Act. In its current formulation, unless parties manifest a 
different intention, the costs and expenses are determined and apportioned by the arbitral tribunal in the award 





 Appeals against Arbitral Awards 
 
Incomprehensibly, the Arbitration Act 1995 provides for appeals against arbitral awards. It is not implausible 
to argue that the genesis of this power appear to have been section 22 of the Arbitration Act 1968 which gave 
courts draconian powers over the arbitral process. Under section 39 of the Act, an award may be appealed 
against on questions of law but only if the parties have so agreed. The appeal must be lodged in the High 
Court, and a further appeal lies to the Court of Appeal, if the parties have so agreed. In addition, the High 
Court or Court of Appeal must accord the appellant special leave to appeal.  On appeal, the court has 
jurisdiction to vary the award. The varied award becomes the award of the arbitral tribunal concerned. This 
section appear to contradict section 35 of the Act which provide for the setting aside of arbitral awards. 
Although section 39 is restricted to “questions of law,” it would not be unreasonable to surmise that the High 
Court has jurisdiction to determine such questions in an application to set aside an arbitral award. 
 
                                                          
174 (1974) A.C. 727, (1974) 1 AII E.R. 859 
175 § 16 
176 The English Arbitration Act 1996 has a provision to that effect 
177 § 18 (1) 
178 Supra note 108 at 320 
179  § 19 (1) made reference  to „”the cost of the reference and award” 
180 Id. 
181 §  32 (6) (a-b) 
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The foregoing review exhibits a substantial dysfunction between certain provisions of the Arbitration Act 
1995 and enhancement of the arbitral process. This antagonism can only be mitigated by developing a 
coherent policy on arbitration and ADR coupled with a comprehensive review and revision of the Act. 
 
 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
This paper sought to illustrate that the legal framework on arbitration in Kenya is responsible for the 
inadequate utilization of the arbitral process and ADR in dispute resolution. Using the dispute resolution 
mechanisms of the Kikuyu, Kamba and Kipsigis ethnic groups, we have demonstrated that customary 
arbitration and mediation, though not described by such charismatic terms characterized dispute resolution in 
many pre-colonial societies. We have shown that the legal framework transplanted to the country by the 
colonial power at the beginning of the last century failed to take cognizance of these customary practices 
which characterized the people‟s culture in dispute resolution. The purported introduction of the arbitral 
process by the Arbitration Ordinance 1914 was doomed to fail as it did not appreciate local circumstances in 
addition to other weaknesses. There was discordance between the law and local practices in dispute resolution. 
It was not an astonishment that the Ordinance fell into desuetude as soon as it was enacted.  
 
There is no gainsaying that the arbitral law has largely been deficient in local content, and this has acted as a 
disincentive to the embracement arbitration by the local population. As underscored elsewhere, the Arbitration 
Act 1968 was a carbon copy of the English Arbitration Act 1889 and 1950. Its drafters used undefined heavy 
legal terminology and convoluted sentences and this did not bespeak well for the arbitral process. We have 
demonstrated how the Arbitration Act 1968 placed an arduous burden on persons who applied for a stay of 
proceedings and gave courts boundless discretion in determining such applications. This had an attenuating 
effect on the applicant‟s case. The Court of Appeal decision in Esmailji v. Mistry Shamji Lalji & Co 
exemplifies this point. The position was ameliorated by the Arbitration Act 1995 which made the grant of a 
stay of proceedings almost automatic.
182
 Like its predecessor, the Arbitration Act 1968 was ill-equipped to 
bolster the arbitral process. For the most part, it played a symbolic role in promoting arbitration.  
 
Evidently, the Act remained in the statute books for many years notwithstanding the availability of more 
progressive laws, such as the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model law. And when the time was 
ripe for comprehensive reforms, the legislature adopted the model law without any attempt to supplement or 
localize it. Although the Arbitration Act 1995 is indisputably an improvement on the previous Act, and 
augments arbitration in certain respects, its omissions hinder it from playing the catalytic role it was supposed 
to play in promoting arbitration. From the analysis, it is evident that the country adopted crucial legal reforms 
belatedly and in a manner less than comprehensive. For example, Kenya ratified the New York Convention in 
1989; thirty years after it became operational; however, no attempt was made to domesticate the convention. 
The model law was adopted in 1995, ten years after it was promulgated. 
 
The analysis has laid it bare that adoption of the model law was more of an anticlimax because it has neither 
engendered nor endeared the arbitral process to the local population. However, courts have enforced all 
arbitral awards filed in compliance with the provisions of the Act. Both the High Court and Court of Appeal 
have shown a remarkable disinclination to interfere with arbitral awards. Although the Arbitration Act 1995 is 
much simpler than the previous legislation, and breaks new grounds in various matters, it is inadequate in 
many respects. For example, it does not consider arbitration a profession or semi-profession and this explains 
the absence of minimum qualifications for appointment and detailed obligations for arbitral tribunals. Perhaps 
the most conspicuous omission of the Act is the failure to recognize ADR mechanisms. This is exacerbated by 
the fact that it makes no provision for the requisite institutional framework to promote arbitration and other 
dispute resolution mechanisms. Undeniably, the Act fell short of expectations.  
 
It is acknowledged that in the recent past courts have enforced the provisions of the Arbitration Act with 
exceptional diligence and this portends well for the arbitral process. While this is laudable, it cannot singularly 
enhance arbitration. Admittedly, it is a positive beginning.  From the discussion it is incontestable that there 
has never been a comprehensible policy on the place and role of arbitration and ADR mechanisms in dispute 
resolution. This evinces the absence of a robust legal framework on arbitration and ADR mechanisms and the 
inexcusable omissions in the legal regime.  Arguably, it is inexplicable why it has taken so long for the 
legislature to provide for arbitration and ADR in other relevant statutes. The possibility of having done so 
many years ago is exemplified by the provisions of the Labor Relations Act 2007 which is explicit that a 
collective agreement between an employer, group or employers or employers organization and a trade union 
may provide for conciliation or arbitration of any category of trade disputes between the parties.
183
 
                                                          
182 Applications have only been denied in circumstances in which they were not filed on time. 
183  § 58 (1) 
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Inevitably, this irresolute approach has not engendered the arbitral process. Having come to the conclusion 
that the current legal regime on arbitration is inadequate in many respects, it is imperative to make 
recommendations for reform.  
 
If arbitration and ADR mechanisms are to be espoused in Kenya, it is necessary to institutionalize and 
popularize the processes. First, it is incumbent on the Government to formulate a systematic policy on 
methods of settlement of civil disputes otherwise than by litigation. Emphasis should now be on arbitration 
and the alternative mechanisms. The policy would give the legal framework the necessitous paradigmatic shift 
as it would constrain amendments to the Arbitration Act in several ways. Second, the Act should expressly 
provide for ADR mechanisms, such as mediation. Third, it should recognize arbitration as a profession or 
semi-profession, prescribe minimum qualifications for members, duties, immunity and clearly articulated 
standards of conduct. Third, courts should be mandated to require parties to civil proceedings to utilize 
arbitration or any other form of ADR before proceeding with the case. Lastly, the Act should to create an 
institution with authority to popularize arbitration and ADR mechanisms. This body should be vested with 
legislative power to make rules germane to the professions etiquette and other matters pertinent to the 
enhancement of arbitration and ADR. The body should be mandated to consult with the Chief Justice for 
purposes of formulating rules to institutionalize court mandated arbitration. 
 
Finally, the legislature should be more pro-active in promoting arbitration and ADR. It should expressly 
provide that parties to disputes under different statutes such as, Insurance Act, Retirement Benefits Act, 
Capital Markets Act, and others may refer them to arbitration or mediation in the first instance. Such 
innocuous provisions would assist in popularizing and institutionalizing arbitration and ADR. It is submitted 
that only a multifaceted approach to reforms can elevate arbitration and ADR mechanisms to their rightful 
place in the dispute resolution matrix of the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
